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Ride Making v. Adjudication after Wyman-Gordon
In NLRB v. Delaware Valley Armaments, Inc.' the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that an employer is not denied due
process if the order directing him to file a list of the names and
addresses of its employees was issued pursuant to a hearing on the
union's petition for a representation election. The International
Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO,
petitioned the NLRB for a representation election for the production
and maintenance employees of Delaware Valley Armaments. At the
pre-election hearing the company notified the hearing officer that it
would not file an election eligibility listz on the ground that the Board
lacked authority to order such a filing despite the so-called "Excelsior
Rule."' 3 Nevertheless, the Board's Regional Director ordered the
filing of the list, and the company responded with a partial list. After
being defeated in the election, the union filed objections including,
inter alia, an assertion that the company failed to file the list as
required. The Regional Director conducted an ex parte investigation
and issued a supplemental decision setting aside the election and again
demanding a complete list. When the list was not forthcoming, the
Board issued a subpoena duces tecum directing the company to
produce the list and applied to the federal district court for an order
enforcing the subpoena. The district court held that the Board acted
within its power in directing the filing of the list.5 Delaware Valley
Armaments appealed on the ground that it had been denied
flagrant denial of the rights conferred by-the FOIA. By the end of August, 1970, the FAA had
failed to respond at all to the petitions for disclosure of agency documents, although the requests
had been filed in July with a special request for expedited action. The FAA was apparently
delaying in hopes the students would be forced to return to school. See Letter from Reuben B.
Robertson, I I I, to John A. Volpe, Secretary, Dept. of Transportation, Sept. 17, 1970.
1. 431 F.2d 494 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
2. The company, claiming that most of its women employees refused to give permission
because of union threats and harassment, tendered a list containing the names of all employees
and the addresses of only those employees who consented to the disclosure. The union refused to
accept this list and reserved the right to demand a complete list. Although there had been off-the-
record discussions of the requirement for the list, there was no further discussion of the matter at
the hearing. Id. at 495.3. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), discussed in text accompanying
note 17 infra.
4. The company filed "Exceptions and Request for Review to the Second Supplemental
Decision" which repeated its allegations of union threats and harassment and added a charge
that some of the union organizers had criminal records. 431 F.2d at 495-96.
5. Id. at 497.
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procedural due process when it was not afforded an adjudicatory
hearing before the Board issued the order directing it to file the list. In
a divided opinion the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's order.
The Administrative Procedure Act divides agency action into two
categories-rule making and adjudication.6 This bifurcation is
usually described as the delineation of separate quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers. 7 For rule making the APA provides several
procedural steps to enable all interested parties to participate in the
formulation of a rule which will be effective in the future.'
Adjudication, on the other hand, is a procedure which is limited in
effect to the parties directly involved in the matters being adjudicated
Although the APA establishes requirements and procedures for
formal hearings, 0 adjudication is not limited to such hearings by the
Act. In fact, most of an administrative agency's work is carried out
through the process of "informal adjudication,"' 1 a process which
covers a wide spectrum of conferences, discussions, and settlements
outside the framework of a formal hearing. "Formal" adjudication
conducted at a "formal" hearing is the means for disposing of a
matter which cannot be settled through informal adjudication and at
the same time provides experience and guidance for the formulation of
a general policy or "rule" when the agency decides that one is needed.
Characterizing rule making as "too rigid and inflexible" and rule
amending a "cumbersome process,"' 2 the NLRB has never elected to
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(7) (Supp. V, 1970), provides:
(4) "rule" means the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy
or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency...
(5) "rule making" means agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a
rule;
(6) "order" means the whole or part of a final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule
-making but including licensing;
(7) "adjudication" means agency process for the formulation of an order ....
7. Cf. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.11 (1958). But cf. H. FRIENDLY, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENciES 8-9 (1962).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. V, 1970).
9. Id. § 554.
10. Id. § 556.
11. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 7, § 4.11. See also Shapiro, The Choice of Rule Making or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921,923-24.
12. Hearing on Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies (National Labor
Relations Board) Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1663 (1968).
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take this final step in the progression from informal adjudication to
formal adjudication to rule making. 13 The courts have recognized that
an agency has considerable discretion in any particular case to choose
between rule making and adjudication,14 but this total reliance upon
the latter procedure is contrary to the legislative intent that basic
policy be made in rule-making proceedings whenever possible. 15
The controversy concerning the role of adjudication in the
development of an agency's policy is illustrated by the evolution of the
"Excelsior Rule." Prior to Excelsior Underwear, Inc.' the NLRB
had consistently held that a petitioning union had no right to demand
that an employer provide a list of employees' addresses, although it
did have a right to inspect such a list prior to the election.' The Board
considered the need for providing the union with an address list in an
adjudicative hearing on the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union's
objections to the election which it lost at Excelsior Underwear. The
Board's decision announced a "rule" requiring submission of this
list.' Although the NLRB invited selected amici curiae to submit
briefs on the issue and made the rule applicable only to elections
called 30 days after the decision was announced, there was no effort to
follow the rule-making requirements of the APA. 9.
The Board later relied on the "Excelsior Rule" in requiring
submission of a list in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co."0 In that case
the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court held that the requirement
was invalid as a "rule" because of the Board's failure to comply with
the APA but sustained the requirement for submission of the list in
Wyman-Gordon because the order issued from an adjudicatory pre-
election hearing.21 The plurality opinion considered the possibility ol
remanding the case since the Board had misconceived the law 1 but
recognized that the Board would simply re-issue the order without
citation to Excelsior-a valid procedure in an adjudicator)
13. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 779 n.2 (1969).
14. SEC v. Clenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
15. Id. at 202. See also S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16 (1945); H.R. REP. No.
1980, 79th Cong.; 2d Sess. 23-26 (1946).
16. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
17. See, e.g., Reflector Hardware Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1544 (1958); Wesco Mfg. Co., 97
N.L.R.B. 901 (1951).
18. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. V, 1970).
20. 394 U.S. 759 (1969), revg 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968).
21. 394 U.S. at 766.
22. Id. n.6; see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
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proceeding.2 Three of the justices concurred in the result but on the
ground that such a requirement could be the product of adjudication
or rule making with the choice of method left to the Board. 24 The
remaining two justices in separate opinions concurred with the
plurality opinion's contention that the "Excelsior Rule" was invalid
but argued that this invalidity required that the decision be
remanded.25 Although Wyman-Gordon has been the source of
considerable discussion, commentators have failed to reach
agreement as to whether it will force the NLRB to utilize the
technique of rule making26 or whether it will simply encourage other
agencies to promulgate "rules" through adjudication.2
The Third Circuit in Delaware Valley Armaments applied the
plurality position in Wyman-Gordon to sustain the requirement for
an election eligibility list. The court reasoned .that a pre-election
hearing is an adjudicatory proceeding and therefore an order entered
by it is "unquestionably valid."s The court then set forth two addi-
tional grounds for affirming the district court's order. It noted that a
hearing on a union's petition is the only hearing required by the
National Labor Relations Act 29 and that due process is not violated
when a party is denied a discretionary hearing.30 The court concluded
that the company was not deprived of procedural due process when
the Regional Director decided to conduct an administrative
investigation rather than a hearing on the issue of the employee
eligibility list. The majority opinion also accepted the district court's
23. 394 U.S. at 766. Although the requirement for the list was not actually adjudicated in
Wyman-Gordon, the plurality opinion asserted that the requirement was "not seriously
contestable" and that there was "not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of a proceeding
before the Board [on the issue of the requirement], whether the Board acted through a rule or an
order." Id. at 766-67 n.6. Contra, id. at 783 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 772 (Black, Brennan, Marshall, JJ. dissenting).
25. Id. at 775-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 780-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. See, e.g., I I B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 64 (1969).
27. See. e.g., 394 U.S. at 779 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 781-82 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-I 969, 1970 DuKE L.J. 106-07; 43 TEMP.
L.Q. 160 (1970). For the position that the result cannot be predicted, see 83 HARV. L. REv. 220
(1970); 24 S.W.L.J. 378, 383-84 (1970).
28. 394 U.S. at 766; cf. American Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321, 1329 (5th Cir.
1970), where the court, citing Wyman-Gordon, held that the Board could depart from its
previous decisional rule without following the procedures required by the APA in a rule-making
proceeding since the Board's decision only applied specifically to the parties before it in the
adjudicatory proceeding.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1964); 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(6) (Supp. V, 1970).




finding that the issue had been "adjudicated" in the course of the
administrative investigation .3 The dissenting opinion attacked the
majority's contention that an adjudicatory proceeding had been
conducted, arguing that neither the pre-election hearing nor the off-
the-record discussions among the hearing officer, the company, and
the union satisfied the requirement for a proper "adjudicatory
proceeding. ' 32 If the Board is to require an eligibility list, the dissent
concluded, it must grant the company a hearing on the validity of that
requirement.3
In Excelsior the Board, by means of an adjudicatory hearing,
sought to formulate a rule requiring employers to submit election
eligibility lists. In Wyman-Gordon the Board attempted to apply the
"Excelsior Rule"; that attempt failed although the Court upheld the
Board's order because it was issued as a result of an adjudicatory
proceeding. In Delaware Valley Armaments the Third Circuit also
upheld the requirement for an eligibility list because it was issued as a
result of an adjudicatory proceeding even though the question of the
validity of that requirement in the instant case had not been formally
adjudicated. The court reached this conclusion because it
misunderstood the effect of a prior adjudication and the nature of the
adjudication required in this case. Agency decisions generally have the
force of stare decisis,4 but to apply a holding-the requirement for
the list-from an earlier adjudication-Excelsior by way of Wyman-
Gordon-to another controversy-Delaware Valley Armaments-is
more analogous to an application of res judicata than stare decisis
inasmuch as the former prohibits relitigation of an issue. 6 For a
number of reasons res judicata could not be asserted to apply the
"Excelsior Rule" or "Wyman-Gordon Rule" to Delaware Valley
Armaments.3 7 The use of prior decisions as stare decisis gives the work
31. 431 F.2d at 498-99.
32. Id. at 501.
33. Id. at 501-02.
34. See IB J. MooRE & T. CURRIER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 0A03, at 353 (2d ed,
1965). "Stare decisis. . . to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1577-78 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also 394 U.S. at 766.
35. See generally IB, J. MooRE, supra note 34, 0A05. "Resjudiciata. . . rule that final
judgment or decree on merits by court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of rights of parties
or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in former suit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1470 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
36. See IBJ. MooRE, supranote34, T 0.405(2).
37. The parties are not the same, and the issue, the requirement for producing the election
eligibility list for Delaware Valley Armaments, is not precisely the same. See generally
id. 0.405-0.415.
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of an agency a degree of uniformity and stability while permitting it to
retain the flexibility necessary to deal with "the fluctuating problems
of the administrative process." The flexibility is derived by the fact
that stare decisis provides merely a rebuttable guide for adjudication.
If adjudication is required, stare decisis does not obviate that
requirement. Thus, any adjudication which occurred in Excelsior does
not dispose of an issue requiring adjudication in a later case. The
NLRB's contention that the order was valid because it was issued in
the course of an "adjudicatory proceeding" 39 is likewise unpersuasive.
A particular issue is not "adjudicated" on the basis of the forum
which-decides it. The Board cannot hold a hearing on one issue-the
union's petition-and promulgate an "adjudicated" order on
another-the requirement for the list-any more than a court can give
a defendant a "fair trial" on a charge of burglary-and convict him of
murder.4" This confused merger of the issue being adjudicated and the
ancillary issue of the election eligibility list is also reflected in the
manner in which the court extended the "certification of worker
representatives" statutory adjudication exemption 41 to the separate
issue of the order requiring the list. In the absence of a rule requiring
such a list, the APA demands that the union obtain an order requiring
it and bear the burden of showing a need for it.42 Excelsior could be
cited in such a request for its stare decisis value, but the company
must have the opportunity to present "[a]ny oral or documentary
evidence."'4 3 This procedure differs sharply from civil proceedings in a
federal court where a subpoena duces tecum may be issued "as a
matter of course, ' 44 but there the question is covered by a rule, 45 and
furthermore, the party subject to the subpoena may raise objections
38. Id. 0.403, at 358.
39. 431 F.2d at 497.
40. It may be argued that Excelsior and Wyman-Gordon had put the company on notice that
the requirement was at issue and that it should have presented all of its objections at the pre-
election hearing. This argument overlooks the fact that the burden of proof was on the union. 5
U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970). In the criminal law analogy, the defendant may be aware that
a death occurred in the course of the burglary, but he is not required to defend a charge of mur-
der until and unless the prosecution brings that charge; if the charge is brought but not substan-
tiated by evidence, the defendant need not present a defense at all.
41. Id. § 554(a)(6).
42. Id. § 556(d). This section provides: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, the
proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof."
43. Id. "Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a matter of
policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence."
44. 5 J. MooRE, supra note 34, 45.05(!) (2d ed. 1969).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b).
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by a motion to quash under the same rule."6 Although the term
"adjudication" encompasses many informal administrative
activities, 47 the request for an order requiring an eligibility list clearly
demands a higher level of action. Wyman-Gordon focused primarily
on the invalidity of the "Excelsior Rule" qua rule and approved the
requirement only in the interest of expediting that particular case. The
error of that decision is demonstrated in Delaware Valley Armaments
which transformed expediency into unassailable doctrine. Once the
Court recognizes that there is no "rule" requiring this list and that an
order requiring it can be issued only after a formal adjudication of
that issue, it will increase the pressure on the NLRB to conform to the
legislative intent that rule making be the primary means for the
determination of policy. The Board will then be faced with a clear
choice between conducting rule-making proceedings or properly
adjudicating the issue anew in each case.
Requirement of Notice and Hearing in Rate-Making Proceeding
In Moss v. CAB 8 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that certain fare increases approved by the
Civil Aeronautics Board, which the Board claimed were carrier-made
and within its power to allow,49 had actually been prescribed by the
Board and were illegal because granted without fulfillment of the
public notice and hearing requirements applicable to fare increases
specified and imposed by the Board itself.50 The petitioners, 32
Congressmen, had complained to the CAB on several occasions about
its practice of holding ex parte meetings with air carrier
representatives concerning the need for increased fares. Following a
series of such meetings the carriers filed tariffs with the Board,
proposing new rates to take effect after 30 days.5' While its decision
on these rates was pending, the Board held another ex parte meeting
with the carriers,5 2 after which it announced that it would hold a
46. Id.
47. See note 12 supra.
48. 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
49. See Federal Aviation Act § 1002(g), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1964) (if the Board does
not suspend proposed fare increases within thirty days after filing, they become effective);
Id. § 403(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(d).
50. Id. § 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d).
51. The carriers were following the procedure prescribed in 49 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1964). See
notes 64-68 infra and accompanying text.
52. Congressman Moss requested, but was denied, admission to this meeting. 430 F.2d at
894 & n. 12.
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